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Chapter 11
The Truth About Accuracy
Filip Buekens and Fred Truyen
The goal of inquiry is substantial, significant, illuminating
truth.
(Haack 1994, p. 203)
Abstract When we evaluate the outcomes of investigative actions as justified or
unjustified, good or bad, rational or irrational, we make, in a broad sense of the
term, evaluative judgments about them. We look at operational accuracy as a
desirable and evaluable quality of the outcomes and explore how the concepts of
accuracy and precision, on the basis of insights borrowed from pragmatics and
measurement theory, can be seen to do useful work in epistemology. Operational
accuracy (but not metaphysical accuracy!) focuses on how a statement fits an
explicit or implicit standard set by participants involved in a shared project.
While truth can remain a thin semantic property of propositions, operational
accuracy, as a quality of an outcome of inquiry and typically attached to a
statement, a model, a diagram or a representation is an evaluation based on the
non-epistemic goals set by the goal of inquiry (which every inquiry has), and a
substantial evaluative notion. The goals, often made explicit by relevant questions
in a context of inquiry, act as a filter, with truths a reliable epistemic method has
access to functioning as input, and accurate representations as its output. Respon-
sible inquiry seeks pragmatic equilibrium between what reliable knowledge on the
one hand and degrees of accuracy required by the goal of inquiry.
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11.1 Introduction
When we evaluate the outcomes of investigative actions as justified or unjustified,
good or bad, rational or irrational, we make, in a broad sense of the term, evaluative
judgments about them.1 We look at operational accuracy as a desirable quality of
outcomes of investigative actions, typically put forward as contributions to purpo-
sive exchanges between informants engaged in shared projects. Following those
who seek to distinguish good from bad knowledge (Stephen Hetherington), what
one ought to and what shouldn’t be known (Miranda Fricker) or what counts as
valuable knowledge (Stephen Grimm), we ask what it takes to acquire and provide
accurate information, as well as how accuracy and the reliability of investigative
methods interact. Inaccurate truths are easy to obtain, and we could not easily be
mistaken about them – our knowledge of them is “safe”. So, while the truth exerts a
powerful attraction, serious inquiry – inquiry with a purpose (and sheer curiosity
can make any subject matter interesting) should deliver accurate truths. What
counts as an accurate truth (or set of truths) ultimately depends on the
non-epistemic goals of the exchange. Unimpeded by extra-epistemic constraints
on what one ought to know, aiming at truth is reduced to a pointless game.
Standards of accuracy – what will count as accurate information – will ultimately
be dependent on what we ought to know given the project that motivates the
investigative effort that engages us.2
The sake for which we seek knowledge about a subject matter cannot itself be
defined in epistemic terms; any reason why X wants to know p derives from a
non-epistemic project, perhaps ultimately driven by pure curiosity (as Hume
pointed out in the Treatise, and Jane Heal forcefully argued). We want “truth as
such, but not for its own sake” (Heal 1988; Sosa 2003). But accuracy, like relevance
and salience, is an elusive notion (Schelling 1960). Our aim in this chapter is to
precisify a useful concept in epistemology and philosophy of science by locating it
within a network of epistemic and practical principles. Accuracy is too useful to be
identified with truth.
Begin with a prima facie objection: isn’t accuracy just a synonym for truth?
Ernest Sosa begins a recent presentation of his acclaimed virtue approach to
knowledge with the thesis that “[b]elief is a kind of performance, which attains
one level of success if it is true (or accurate)” (Sosa 2011, p. 3).3 The principle that
“an epistemic agent ought to approximate the truth”, is called Accuracy by Leitgeb
1We would like to thank Marcel Boumans, Carlo Martini, Chris Kelp and participants at the
Bayreuth Conference for valuable suggestions.
2 The as such/not for its own sake- qualification precludes the reduction of truth to some other
value (the value we attach to the sake itself).
3 Ernest Sosa holds that belief aims at truth and that we want correct answers (Sosa 2011, p. 56).
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and Pettigrew (2010). In a paper that explores what makes truth good, Linda
Zagzebski holds that “[b]elief aims at accurately representing some part of reality
propositionally. When a belief is true it is accurate” (Zagzebski 2004, pp. 135–6,
note omitted). Bernard Williams (2002) defines what the virtue of Accuracy (which
is itself, according to him, the counterpart of another veritistic virtue, Sincerity) in
terms of truth:
If someone seriously wants to find out the truth on an issue, we can say that this is
equivalent to his wanting to get into the following condition: If p, to believe that p, and if
not p, to believe that not p. (Williams 2002, p. 133)
Williams characterizes Accuracy (as he uses the term) as “the desire for truth
‘for its own sake’ – the passion for getting it right” (Williams 2002, p. 126), but we
have already indicated that the desire for truth “for its own sake” is questionable.
Williams is of course aware of that: the conversational implicature suggested by the
definite article in “finding out the truth”, intimates that the concern is to find the
accurate and/or relevant truths in view of one’s non-epistemic aims and goals.4 In
“accurate truths” the adjective’s role is not pleonastic. “True, but wholly inaccu-
rate” suggests a severe criticism.
While accuracy is arguably a thick evaluative concept, truth-minimalists reject
that truth itself is an evaluative concept (Horwich 1998). Although the concept
often appears in norms like “one should assert what is true”, minimalism holds that
such norms are mere generalizations of particular norms as “One should asserts that
grass is green only if grass is green”. Moreover, the normativity of a concept does
not follow from its appearance in a norm, for that would entail that any concept is
normative (“being over 18” can appear in a hypothetical norm, but it is clearly not
an intrinsically normative concept). Donald Davidson and Allan Gibbard have
questioned whether truth can count as the aim of inquiry (Davidson 2005; Gibbard
2007), suggesting that truth is a goal in name only and that what matters are the
justifications one provides. Jane Heal (1988/89), in a neglected paper defending
minimalism about truth, holds that we never seek truth for its own sake. When
someone’s actions can be described as trying to find out the truth, a further more
specific description under which her investigative action was intentional is always
possible, and the description articulates a goal the agent holds because it is derived
from the overall project in which her investigative action has a proper place.
4 If, as Grimm (2008) points out, “we think that pursuing the truth is intrinsically valuable, then
why are we unapologetically indifferent to so many truths? If you propose an evening memorizing
the phone book for Topeka, Kansas and I decline, have I really missed an opportunity to enrich
myself, from an epistemic point of view? If the truth is always intrinsically worth pursuing, then it
seems that I have. And yet that conclusion seems ridiculous” (Grimm 2008, pp. 725–26). Talk of
pursuing the truth is highly misleading, as Hookway (2007) points out: “We seek answers to our
questions which are relevant, illuminating and useful, so truth is, at most, one among a set of
standards that we use in evaluating inquiries” (Hookway 2007, p. 2).
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Goldman (1999) concurs. Heal also points out that this strategy need not assume a
non-relational conception of truth. Even if we seek “correspondence” between us
and the world, correspondence as such is not the goal of inquiry. Inquiry aims at
finding out whether p, not whether a certain relation between the inquirer and the
world holds. It is the fact that p that matters for one’s projects, not the relation
between the inquirer and that fact.
Our first proposal is therefore to distinguish the thick concept of accuracy from
the thin notion of truth.5 What counts as accurate or inaccurate information clearly
varies with the purpose of the model or representation it is supposed to qualify. As
Van Fraassen puts it, “[t]he evaluation as accurate or inaccurate is highly context-
dependent. A subway map, for example, is typically not to scale, but only shows
topological structure. Relative to its typical use and our typical needs, it is accurate;
with a change in use or need, it would at once have to be classified as inaccurate”
(van Fraassen 2008, p. 15).6 Note that Van Fraassen does not speak of the truth of a
subway map (can maps be true?) and that few would accept that truth or falsity
would be highly context-dependent.
According to Teller (2004, 2009), scientific representations should not be
thought of as true or false. While it makes perfect sense to talk of one theory
being more accurate than another and therefore “closer to the truth”, none of our
theories are flat-footedly true. Teller’s suggestion, however, confuses the useful
idea of approximating standards of accuracy with the more contentious idea of
metaphysical truth approximation.7 Moreover, it would involve an implausible
error theory about accuracy because, if Teller were right about ineliminable
discrepancies between a representation and its target, no representation could
ever be completely accurate.8 Secondly, the claim that every model misrepresents
its object and that all representations are therefore inaccurate confuses what is
absent from a representation with what a representation misrepresents as being the
case. Thirdly, inaccurate knowledge is – on the account presented here – not an
oxymoron, for known truths can be inaccurate, and inaccurate statements often
5Minimalists can hold that the descriptive element in the concept of accuracy is simply truth; a
theory of what counts as accurate explores the evaluative aspect of accuracy. The extension of a
thick concept cannot be determined without sharing or imaginatively entering the insider’s
evaluative point of view. The insider’s point of view in the case of accuracy is recognition of
the project one needs accurate information for.
6 According to G.L. Hallett, “[i]t is in general desirable for tables, maps, statistics and descriptions
to be accurate, as it is for statements to be true. Accuracy is usually a virtue, as truth is, and to say
that something is accurate is generally to praise it” (Hallett 1988, p. 83).
7 Tal (2011) suggests that the correlate concept of metaphysical measurement accuracy is truth.
The counterpart of operational measurement accuracy is standardization. More on the relevance of
standards in Sects. 11.2 and 11.3.
8 An error theory about flatness was famously developed in Unger (1975).
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convey falsehoods and/or reveal inappropriate choices of standards.9,10 It seems
then that cashing out accuracy as “approximating the truth” doesn’t really capture
what is useful about the concept. Teller’s measurement-analogy suggests that it
might useful to turn to the science of measurement for further refinement of the
concept and we will pursue that analogy later in this chapter. Tal (2011) discusses,
in the context of measurement theory, no less than five different notions of
measurement accuracy. Metaphysical measurement accuracy is the closeness of
agreement between a measured value of a quantity and its true value which
suggests, under a traditional understanding of truth as correspondence with a
mind-independent reality, a form of realism about quantities. Epistemic accuracy
refers to the closeness of agreement among values reasonably attributed to a
quantity based on its measurement. The correlate concept is (un)certainty. Com-
parative accuracy refers to the closeness of agreement among values of a quantity
obtained by using different measuring systems. Its correlate concept is reproduc-
ibility. Finally there is the pragmatic measurement notion of being accurate for,
where the measurement meets the requirements of a specific application (Tal 2011).
Operational measurement accuracy – closeness of agreement between a measured
value of a quality and a value of that quantity obtained by reference to a measure-
ment standard – serves best the concept under scrutiny. Metaphysical measurement
accuracy, on the other hand, is the closeness of agreement between a measurement
value and its “true value”, but it is usually assumed in physics that, in this sense, the
true value of a physical magnitude is simply unknowable. The analogy would make
truth (and therefore accuracy) by definition unattainable. The focus must therefore
be on the relation between a statement and some standard in view of which it will be
evaluated as (in)accurate.11 This suggests a further objection to Teller’s approach:
the operational accuracy of a measurement result assumes that the standards are set
in such a way that they are attainable and that attainment can be recognized by us. If
truth were the fixed standard of accuracy that holds in all contexts of inquiry,
9 Teller (2009) connects precision, accuracy and truth as follows: “The way we talk, and even more
strikingly, the way we think about our subject matters, all seems to operate in terms of determinate
truths, unqualified in any way by either imprecision or inaccuracy. How can this be if, as I claim,
inexactness is ubiquitous?” (Teller 2009, p. 15). See http://maleficent.ucdavis.edu:8080/paul/
manuscripts-and-talks/T-F%20In%20Science (consulted July 2013). In the same paper, Teller
holds that “A representation is inaccurate insofar as there are discrepancies between the represen-
tation’s target and the way the representation represents the target as being. If the true value of a
quantity is 6, characterizing that value as 5.9 is precise, but inaccurate” (Teller 2009, p. 2). If
(public) representations are seen as models, it should be obvious (hence not a disqualifying
feature) that they will be imprecise, incomplete, not without assumptions, etc. Is the well-known
model of London’s subway map accurate? Yes – for the purposes of the visitor.
10 Braun and Sider (2007) defend an error theory about truth: “Truth is an impossible standard that
we never achieve. [. . .] (I)t would be pointlessly fussy to enforce this standard to the letter,
requiring the (exact) truth, . . . nor would it be desirable to try, for the difference between the
legitimate disambiguations of our sentences are rarely significant to us” (Braun and Sider 2006,
p. 135).
11 Tal’s definitions are inspired by the International Vocabulary of Metrology (VIM).
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recognizing the accuracy of a statement would be problematic since, as Frege
pointed out in Der Gedanke, truth is an unrecognizable property.
In Sect. 11.2 we explore and defend the distinction between truth and accuracy
and show that they qualify different objects. In Sect. 11.3 we look at accuracy as a
distinctive quality of contributions to conversational exchanges: how is accuracy
created, how are investigative actions with accurate outcomes obtained, and who is
in charge of saying what is and what isn’t going to count as accurate information?
We start with some Gricean examples, but the key analogy will be drawn from
measurement theory and the interaction between accuracy and precision in mea-
surement (Sect. 11.4). In the final section (Sect. 11.5) we reject Alvin Goldman’s
veritistic characterization of experts as those who “know more about a subject
matter” (Goldman 1999). A key element in distinguishing laymen from experts is
the degree of accuracy (and not just truth) of the latter’s contributions, relative to
their domain of expertise, combined with the capacity to set the appropriate
standards of accuracy required by the goal of the investigative action in which
they are engaged or are being asked to contribute.12
11.2 Accuracy Entails Truth
What speaks against identifying of truth with accuracy is that while truth is a thin
concept, accuracy is arguably thick. Qualifying a model, representation, diagnosis,
assessment or contribution as accurate (or not accurate, or not very accurate, or as
more accurate than was required) is an appraisal, not only of the contribution itself
but also of the agent who made it, who was responsible for the accurate model or
result. Accuracy, unlike truth, easily transfers from statements to agents, and one
can be accurate at one epistemic task but not at others. Unlike truth, accuracy
unproblematically admits of degrees.
Against identifying the concepts of truth and accuracy (or speaking the truth and
speaking accurately) also speak broadly Gricean considerations, which suggest that
an accurate statement can be false. “Everyone in the room speaks French” may be
accurate, but not (strictly) true. A model or simulation may be said to be accurate
enough for some purpose but not for another, even if the model itself is strictly
speaking false which explains why models and simulations are sometimes thought
of as “useful fictions.” “France is hexagonal” is literally false, but seems accurate if
“Italy is booth-shaped” is also accepted as accurate. We discard this family of
objections, first on the grounds, already mentioned, that truth and accuracy are often
used interchangeably, which suggests that a statement’s being accurate (for some
purpose) but strictly speaking false depends on how we single out the proposition
12Another argument against a purely veritistic characterization of experts is that, paradoxically,
laymen run a lesser risk of having false beliefs because they have fewer beliefs about a domain or
subject matter.
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expressed by the statement to be qualified. By invoking the principle that proposi-
tions expressed by assertions can contain unarticulated constituents and that one
such unarticulated constituent is (in the relevant cases) the “roughly” or “more or
less”-operator: if France is hexagonal is roughly true, then it is and objective,
unqualified truth that France is roughly hexagonal. Similarly, if it is more or less
true that the room is full of speakers who speak French, it is true (simpliciter) that
the room is more or less full with speakers who speak French (Horwich 1998, p. 63).
Statements that are “more or less”, “roughly” or “approximately” or “sort of” true
are equivalent with unqualified truths when the unarticulated constituent – in this
case an operator – is integrated in the proposition qualified as true or false. What is
strictly speaking false may, with the help of unarticulated “more or less” or “sort
of”-operator, be transformed into an asserted plain truth. Interpretative charity
(of the Gricean or Davidsonian kind) suggests that some such operation is ubiqui-
tous in micro-interpretation. The fact that the compositionally determined minimal
semantic content of a sentence – its literal meaning – is almost never literally true
on occasions of use doesn’t entail that we cannot successfully use such a sentence to
make true or accurate assertions (Borg 2005; Cappelen and Lepore 2004). What we
literally say is often under-articulated, underspecified and/or imprecise because a
more precise articulation would take too much time and/or cognitive effort. What
can be plausibly inferred by the intended audience need not be explicitly articulated
by the speaker (Levinson 2000). Semantic and pragmatic considerations thus speak
for and not against the claim that accuracy entails truth. Finally, it should be noted
that while every accurate statement is also true, not every useful statement
(or belief, for that matter) need to be true. There are patently false beliefs that are
useful – just think of placebo effects, for example, and how they constitutively
depend on having false beliefs about certain pills. No amount of tinkering with
semantic contents can make such useful-but-false beliefs true.
11.3 Accuracy Is More than Truth
Further arguments give credence to the claim that accurate truths involving a
domain D are a strict subset of the possible informative truths about D. Consider
Grice’s well-known example: A is planning with B an itinerary for a holiday in
France. Both know that A wants to see his friend C, if doing so would not involve
too great a prolongation of the journey.
A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.
B’s answer is, as he very well knows, less informative than is required to meet
A’s needs. This infringement of theMaxim of Quantity (“Make your contribution as
informative as is required for the current purposes of the conversation”) can be
explained only on the supposition that B is aware that being more informative
would require saying something that infringed on theMaxim of Quality, (“Don’t say
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what you lack adequate evidence for”). Consequently, B implies that he does not
know in which town C lives (Grice 1967/1989, p. 34). Grice’s abductive explana-
tion assumes that it is common knowledge among the participants what would
count as an accurate answer. Although what B says is true, a more informative
answer would infringe on the maxim of Quality. This would explain why B’s
contribution implicates that he does not know where C lives, given the informal
standard of what would count as accurate in the conversation (and made explicit in
Grice’s gloss that accompanies his example; the gloss is supposed to make explicit
what the participants, on the basis of the Cooperative Principle, agree is the purpose
or general direction of the conversation).
The example illustrates how the practical purpose of the informative transaction
fixes what will count as an accurate (and not just true) answer.13 If A and B were to
discuss C’s secret whereabouts on a need-to-know standard, B’s original answer
would have been accurate enough. The operative standards of accuracy in an
epistemic exchange are therefore a function of the project one is engaged (where
to go, how to build a plane that carries 520 passengers over at least 8,000 miles,
etc.,).14 Merely telling and acquiring truths (or justified truths) independently of a
mutually recognized project would be a parody of a purposive conversation. Note
that I can provide accurate information, given that I know what you need to know in
order to realize your non-epistemic purposes. But I do not thereby have to adopt
your goals, which determine why you want to know what you just asked me.
An assertion’s accuracy cannot be transferred to what the proposition that
specifies the asserted content logically entails. If there were 520 passengers on
the plane, there were also more than 200 on the plane, but the latter truth is
inaccurate if we want to know how many passengers died in the crash. Although
one can say that it is “not inaccurate” to assert that there were more than 200 pas-
sengers on the plane (and especially so if one doesn’t know better), such a remark
would in this context surely be dismissed as inappropriate or even misleading.
Epistemologists often object to the unqualified principle that we should believe
the truth, under the bidirectional reading that (i) we ought to believe what is true,
and that (ii) our beliefs ought to be true (Goldman 1999; Sosa 2003; Piller 2008).
Why invest costly epistemic efforts in irrelevant subjects just because the epistemic
actions yield true beliefs (Grimm 2008, p. 731)? Acquiring true beliefs is, as such,
not a good way to measure how we benefit from investigative actions (Heal 1988)
Ernest Sosa demurs concerning the claim that truth itself (“as such”) is valuable:
At the beach on a lazy summer afternoon, we might scoop a handful of sand and carefully
count the grains. This would give us an otherwise unremarked truth, something that on the
view before us [truth as such is valuable] is at least a positive good, other things equal. This
view I hardly understand . . . it is hard to see any sort of value in one’s having that truth.
(Sosa 2003; pp. 44–5)
13 Pragmatists would define the true answer with the one that satisfies our non-epistemic purposes.
This cannot be correct, for false beliefs also help us realize extra-epistemic goals. There are useful
falsehoods and useless truths.
14 See Hempel 1965, p. 333 for a defense of a purely intellectual interest in truth.
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Lots of truths can be found in any domain, but a genuine interest in a domain or
subject matter will necessarily be motivated by projects which determine what will
be accurate information about that subject matter, the kind of things you need to
know in order to successfully move forward. Even if one’s investigative efforts into
a domain are motivated by Humean curiosity, any sensible inquirer will set for
himself standards of accuracy, and only when attainable by the inquirer, will they
count as reasonable standards (an observation already made by David Hume in the
Treatise, but going back to remarks of Cicero in De Officiis). Indicators of the
veritistic quality of an assertion or belief, like coherence or simplicity, do not
suffice to turn truths into accurate truths (an inaccurate truth can be perfectly well
justified). Neither is accuracy a direct function of the evidence one possesses. It is
the sake for which we seek truths – the project in which inquiry is necessarily
embedded – from which standards of accuracy must derived. The value of the goal
of truth is fully swamped by the further goal of acquiring and exchanging accurate
knowledge (recall that accuracy entails truth). The question “Why do you want to
know that?” points at what will provide the source of the standard of accuracy
required to give a useful answer.
Thirdly, we already pointed out that unlike accuracy, truth doesn’t admit of
degrees (Crane 2014). If two statements S and S0 both express true propositions, one
cannot be more true than the other, but in the same context of inquiry S can be more
accurate than S0 (but see Elgin 2004, Braun and Sider 2006 for dissent).15 William
James held that truth itself is created (“Truth is made, just as health, wealth and
strength are made, in the course of experience” (James 1907, p. 218)). What James
mistakenly attributes to truth is in fact true of accurate statements. Standards of
accuracy are created and not found, and they must be designed so that they can be
recognizably attained in the course of inquiry by the inquirer. What is going to
count as an accurate result, answer or statement depends on an implicitly or
explicitly set standard, set by agents in view of their projects and the subject matter
they investigate. Experts can decide what is going to count as accurate enough in a
certain context, given a well-designed project or purpose.
Fourth, the accuracy of a statement is a relational and recognizable property,
while truth is, not only on the minimalist account of the concept, neither relational
nor recognizable. Where Frege held in The Thought that the property of being true,
unlike the property of being yellow, is not recognizable, Dummett’s analogy
between truth and winning a game assumes that truth is a recognizable property:
It is part of the concept of winning a game that a player plays to win, and this part of the
concept is not conveyed by a classification of the end positions into winning ones and losing
ones. Likewise, it is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements. We
cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those
circumstances in which we do, and those in which we do not make use of the relevant word,
by describing the usage of the word; we must also give an account of the point of the
concept, explain what we use the word for. (Dummett 1959, pp. 142, 149)
15 J.L. Austin famously held that “true” and “false” indicate “a general dimension of being a right
or proper thing to say, as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances” (Austin 1962, p. 145).
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One can recognize a winning position on a chessboard, but the truth of a belief or
statement does, as Donald Davidson put it, “not come with a ‘mark’ like the date in
the corner of some photographs, which distinguishes them from falsehoods. The
best we can do is test, experiment, keep an open mind . . . Since it is neither a visible
target, nor recognizable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a goal”
(Davidson 2005, p. 6). Since Accuracy relates a statement with a standard, the
operative standards of accuracy should be recognizable by us.16,17 The assessment
of a statement as accurate (in a context) involves a comparison of a statement or
obtained result with a (public) operational standard. (It may well be that identifying
truth with accuracy explains the tendency to seek recognizable standards for truth.)
The setting of operative standards for what is going to count as accurate and their
attainability is informed by what ultimately motivates inquiry. Not that setting the
standard is always a difficult matter. The operative standard may sometimes simply
be set by the relevant Yes/No-question (“What happened? Did a bomb explode, or
was there a gas leak?”), where the conversational context indicates what counts as
an accurate (and not just true) answer. “Something happened” is a true but inaccu-
rate answer.
11.4 Accuracy and Reliability: Interactions
We now leave behind the Gricean analogy and explore a further analogy with
accuracy as used in measurement theory. In measurement theory, the degree of
accuracy indicates the degree of closeness of a measured or calculated quantity to
its reference value, sometimes misleadingly referred to as the “true value”, for no
measurement is absolutely (i.e. metaphysically) accurate.18 Its complementary
concept is precision, which indicates the degree to which a series of measurements
or calculations have similar outcomes. Precision reflects the reliability of the
method that yields measurement results. This gives us four qualifications of the
outcomes of such an inquiry:
Accurate and precise (d)
Inaccurate, but precise (a)
Accurate but imprecise (b)
Inaccurate and imprecise (c)
16 Frege held that “[t]ruth is not a quality that corresponds with a particular kind of sense-
impression. . .. That the sun has risen is seen to be true on the basis of sense-impressions. But
being true is not a material, perceptible property” (Frege 1918/1999, p. 88).
17 “In principle”, because we may not yet have designed or developed the instruments or mea-
surement tools that yield results accurate enough for our purposes, and it may be impossible to
design tools that will work sufficiently accurately to realize our non-epistemic goals. Thanks to
Chris Kelp for help here.
18 It is impossible to make a perfectly precise measurement (see footnote 3).
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In measurement theory precision refers to the similarity of a series of measure-
ment results, while accuracy is obtained if a token is close enough to an indepen-
dently fixed value (the standard). Only when accuracy (a property of a token result)
and precision (a property of a pattern of tokens, or a type) are as required by the
standards is a measurement result deemed valid. The relevant correlative concept of
the measurement-theoretic notion of precision in epistemology is that of a reliable
process. Note, first, that even extremely reliable methods need not yield accurate
truths. Very precise measurements can be “off the mark” (see Fig. 11.1, upper left
corner). Just as the overall precision (reliability) of a series of measurement results
depends on its repeatability, a reliable epistemic process must be robust, i.e. hold in
the actual world and in nearby possible worlds.19 In his version of a reliabilist
account of knowledge, Robert Nozick’s modus operandi are tracking connections
which correspond with the fact believed (see Nozick 1981): (i) if p were not true,
the agent wouldn’t believe that p, and (ii) if p were true (under circumstances
slightly differing from those actually obtaining), he would (still) believe that
p obtains. Once it is assumed that knowledge is, among other things, true belief
Fig. 11.1 Accuracy and precision
19 Repeatability and reproducibility can be given an intra-world reading or an inter-world reading.
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acquired via reliable methods – a quite uncontroversial assumption – the question
arises what the method is supposed to be reliable for: producing a true belief in
exactly those circumstances in which it is actually deployed, producing a true belief
in circumstances much like those actually obtaining, producing a true belief in all
the circumstances likely enough to be worth considering, or producing a true belief
in all possible circumstances (Craig 1999, p. 54)? The answer must refer to the
project in which the investigative efforts are embedded, and it can reflect what the
epistemic risks one is prepared to take: can we afford to come to know a very
accurate truth with a method which, in very nearby possible worlds, would yield
blatant falsehoods? A variant of Nozick’s account is the safety approach
(Williamson 2000): S knows that p only if, in many nearby worlds where
S believes that p, p is true. One knows that p only if the belief could not have easily
been false. What if the standard of accuracy requires that in many nearby worlds
one’s methods no longer yield reliable results?
Reliability is, like its counterpart precision in measurement theory, character-
ized by a consistent pattern in the outcomes (as in cases (a) and (d) in Fig. 11.1) and
a type-token distinction: a token is reliably produced if it falls under a type of
process that produces “true” tokens in similar circumstances and/or under similar
conditions. But however reliable the outcomes, true beliefs produced by a reliable
process Rmay be wholly inaccurate (see case (a) in Fig. 11.1). To return to Grice’s
example: suppose that B is a very reliable informant with respect to C’s country-
wise whereabouts: in the actual world and in many nearby worlds, B has true beliefs
about C’s location – France or England. Yet it doesn’t follow that B can give the
information required by those who seek C’s exact location in France or England.
His expertise (expertise here defined in terms of reliability) doesn’t yield accurate
information. Alternatively, B may have come to know C’s exact location in France,
but only accidentally so (he may have incidentally overheard a conversation in
which C’s whereabouts were pointed out in quite some detail). Under such condi-
tions he provides accurate information based on an unreliable process. Since
accuracy, unlike precision, is a property of individual tokens, the unreliability of
the method undercuts the epistemic status (true belief, but not knowledge), but not
its accuracy. What he said was accurate relative to the purposes at hand. Note that if
A does not knows that C is in France, then B’s assertion is informative, yet
inaccurate while if he does know that C is in France, the statement is both
uninformative and inaccurate.
There is a further difference between reliability and accuracy. The kind of
accuracy required for an investigative action to be successful is fixed by goals
and projects of the inquirer and features of the domain of investigation. Fixing one’s
goals usually falls under intentional control: we deliberate about them, they are
often subject to negotiation, and they may be morally and practically evaluated.
These goals determine what we should or need to know, and fix standards for what
will count as accurate information. The reliability of belief-forming processes, on
the other hand, is typically not directly accessible to agents (think of perception, for
example). One can be very reliable at a cognitive task, with little or no understand-
ing of what makes one reliable. Our grasp of belief-forming mechanisms may be
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largely tacit. This is one further reason why reliable believers cannot be praised as
such: only when the appropriate reliable processes are mobilized to further the
acquisition of accurate beliefs – things they need to know – can their epistemic
actions be evaluated. In order for reliability to become a feature agents can bring
under intentional control, it is therefore useful to make a distinction between the
reliable methods on the one hand and reliable processes agents don’t have access
to. The choice of a method is, like the standard of accuracy set for oneself,
determined by one’s extra-epistemic goals and an epistemic agent is responsible
for the choice of method.
11.5 How Accuracy and Reliability Interact
Truth doesn’t compete with accuracy. Both fit together in the sense that the focus of
our epistemic aim is set by non-epistemic goals that direct investigative actions
towards finding out the accurate truths, the ones we need to know in order to realize
our projects (again, the project may simply be to come to understand the issue, or to
satisfy our curiosity). The degree of accuracy required by a project in a context
c will interact with the epistemic methods available to the agent in c: the standards
must be such that the method to be followed can attain them. Obtaining accurate
information can be costly. On the other hand, it doesn’t make sense to seek very
accurate information if that would require costly epistemic efforts unmotivated by
goals that motivated the inquiry. Progress in science and technology is often
indicated by setting more ambitious standards of accuracy, driven by the attain-
ability of new goals by improved technology.20
Second observation: Agents need not share non-epistemic goals to agree about
what will count as accurate data, given one of the participant’s non-epistemic goals
and the epistemic actions required to achieve that goal.21 Setting standards unreal-
istically high, given the available methods in the agent’s context of inquiry, puts
one at fault for being too ambitious. Setting standards too low makes accurate truths
easily attainable but almost certainly useless for the purposes they are supposed to
serve. Responsible inquirers manage to strike a balance between the choice of
epistemic methods weighted against the level of accuracy required by their goals;
the required level of reliability sometimes requires that one lowers the standards of
accuracy: too accurate truths may be difficult to obtain. The promise of acquiring
very accurate truths can justify costly epistemic efforts, the cost mainly due to
maintaining sufficient reliability of the methods deployed. In general, it cannot be
20Goldman (1986, p. 98) holds that “truth acquisition is often desired for its own sake, not for
ulterior ends”. But we are not interested in every truth: it is a subject matter that elicits curiosity but
even then only accurate truths will interest us.
21When stakes are high or become more complex, negotiating the relevant standards will take on a
more formal character. Standardization has become a thriving industry.
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the purpose of epistemic interactions that contributors feed each other with inac-
curate truths collected via extremely reliable methods, or extremely accurate truths
acquired via very unreliable methods. When asked for information that cannot be
obtained via reliable methods or that will be highly inaccurate, epistemically
responsible informants should signal a disequilibrium between standards and the
epistemic method deployed.22
The account of accuracy proposed here suggests that it is questionable whether it
is even prima facie good to believe or seek trivial truths, as Lynch (2004, p. 55)
seems to hold. What is open-ended and by definition true is that any subject matter
may be of interest to us, but it does not follow that it is the truth as such that we want
(Grimm 2008, p. 730). Aristotle’s dictum that all humans desire knowledge is
therefore only half true (as one might say). We desire accurate knowledge because
epistemic efforts are by their very nature embedded in non-epistemic projects (Heal
1988). Even pure curiosity requires a sense of what accurate truths about a subject
matter would consist in (trivial, easily obtainable truths about a subject matter do
not satisfy one’s curiosity). The familiar dictum that “the truth is hard to find” must
mean that accurate information about a designated subject matter may be hard to
find. As Craig (1999, p. 223) points out, it is implausible that one can responsibly
recommend an informant (qua expert) without knowledge of the purposes of the
inquiry, which is to say that an informant’s expected accuracy, given standards of
accuracy, will be a determining factor for selecting him/her as an expert. These
considerations plead against a purely veritistic account of expertise. Goldman
(2001) holds that cognitive expertise should be defined in “veritistic” (i.e. truth-
linked) terms:
Experts in a given domain . . . have more beliefs (or higher degrees of belief) in true
propositions and/or fewer beliefs in false propositions within that domain than most other
people (or better: than the vast majority of people) do . . . To qualify as a cognitive expert a
person must possess a substantial body of truths in the target domain. (Goldman 2001,
p. 91).
An expert . . . in domain D is someone who possesses an extensive fund of knowledge (true
belief) and a set of skills or methods for apt and successful deployment of this knowledge to
new questions in the domain. (idem., p. 92)
However, one can, on this account, be a very reliable agent with respect to
domain D, while not being in a position to deliver operationally accurate informa-
tion aboutD. Nobody counts as an expert just because she is blindly amassing truths
on the basis of reliable methods or processes. He/she should know which standards
are operative in the context of inquiry, whether they can be realistically attained
given the epistemic actions afforded by the environment, how refined the method
should be by which they can be attained, and why the operative standards should be
accepted by the intended audience that takes him/her to be the expert on the subject
22 Reliability looks at the informant’s competence to provide true information in a range of
possible worlds, one of which is the actual one.
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matter. Craig speaks of “indicator properties” as what an inquirer seeks to identify
in an informant as a guide to her truth-telling ability (Craig 1999, p. 135). Our
account of operational accuracy suggests an indicator property for experts: their
ability to set appropriate standards of accuracy and to deliver on those standards.23
11.6 Conclusion
Ernest Sosa’s famous analogy of the archer and her target is particularly helpful to
illustrate our main claims: accuracy is to hit the point, and as she practices, she hits
closer to the target and her accuracy improves (Sosa 2011). When her shots are
more tightly clustered they are precise, and the archer has become more reliable.
Hitting the intended target involves compensating for whatever is causing her
precision to veer from the target – she is trying to map actual precision to the
public standard of accuracy (hitting the point). Similarly, in inquiry, we want to be
reliable agents who can provide exactly those truths that satisfy the operative
standards of accuracy relevant in the context of inquiry. What counts as accurate
information cannot be defined in terms of the truths an expert can detect just in
virtue of being a reliable detector of truths. That would be like drawing a circle
around clustered arrows on a board and then claiming that the target was hit. But it
would turn any reliable method into one that yields accurate results. Practical goals,
standards for accuracy, the reliability of one’s epistemic methods in view of these
goals and the operative standards set in view of these goals are interacting in
practical epistemic rationality.24
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